We document the impact of product similarity on sell-side analysts at three distinct levels. At the firm level, firms with greater product similarity have greater analyst coverage and forecast accuracy, and smaller forecast dispersion. At the analyst-firm level, analysts add a firm to (drop a firm from) their portfolios if its product is more (less) similar to the other firms in their portfolios, and analysts issue more accurate forecasts than other analysts covering the same firm when the firm is more similar to the other firms in their portfolios. At the analyst level, analysts whose portfolios comprise firms with greater product similarity are less likely to be fired and more likely to be all-stars. These results contribute to our understanding of the first-order importance of product similarity to analysts' coverage decisions, performance, and career outcomes, and provide an explanation for analysts' industry specialization.
Introduction
Analysts are an important information intermediary for investors and firms under their coverage.
It is well known that brokerage houses organize their research analysts along industry lines and that analysts are industry specialists covering one industry or a few related industries (e.g., Gilson et al. [2001] , Piotroski and Roulstone [2004] , Boni and Womack [2006] , Chan and Hameed [2006] ). Since product similarity is a prominent feature of firms in related industries, it may provide information spillover and thus be a key driver of analysts' specialization.
Chamberlin [1933] and Hotelling [1929] famously show that product differentiation is fundamental to industrial organization. Because of the information spillover through product similarity, following firms with similar products may not only lower analysts' information search and processing costs, but also enhance their industry knowledge, 1 which is ranked as the most important analyst characteristic according to a survey of institutional fund managers by Institutional Investor magazine and is the most important determinant of analyst compensation according to a survey of sell-side analysts by Brown et al. [2013] .
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Yet despite its potential first-order importance to analysts, to the best of our knowledge no prior study investigates the impact of product similarity on analysts, likely due to the difficulty in measuring product similarity. In this paper we take advantage of the product similarity index recently developed by Hoberg and Phillips [2010b] (hereafter, HP index) and used in Hoberg and Phillips [2010a, 2010b] and Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala [2013] , among others, 3 and directly examine the role of product similarity in analysts' coverage decisions, forecast accuracy and dispersion, and career outcomes. Our results provide a potential explanation for the industry specialization of analysts. 4 1 As Bradshaw [2012] explains, "industry knowledge is a firm analyst's understanding of the set of firms competing within an industry, the primary value drivers within that industry, the different strategies adopted by the different firms within the industry…." 2 Institutional Investor magazine asks institutional investors what they really want from sell-side research in an annual survey. For each year in our sample period, industry knowledge was ranked as the number one aspect. 3 We are grateful to Hoberg and Phillips for making their data publicly available. See Section 3.1 and Hoberg and Phillips [2010b] for more details about the construction of the HP index. Other papers typically use the industry definition based on the HP index instead of using the HP index directly. 4 Throughout our paper, we regard the incentives of analysts and their brokerage houses to be effectively the same. If doing something can improve analyst forecast accuracy or career outcomes such as becoming an Institutional Investor all-star, brokerage houses are likely to support such actions because they also benefit.
Product similarity may affect analysts' coverage decisions for several reasons. First, firms with similar products have similar factor inputs / suppliers, production technologies, and markets / customers, and thus correlated costs and revenues. Such correlation may provide economy of scale and positive information externality to analysts because analysts can infer information about one firm from another and better understand firms' business models and markets. Second, more comparable firms and common information also enable analysts to use common metrics across stocks that they cover and facilitate more precise valuation (e.g., Fleischer and Baum [2010] , Zuckerman [2004] ). Third, following firms with similar products may also be a natural result of the limited resources of each analyst such as time, effort, and attention, which should allow analysts to focus on one industry or a few related industries to gain necessary experience and special knowledge to become an expert or a specialist in a particular field. The above three reasons suggest that analysts have incentives to follow firms with similar products to lower the cost of information search and processing and deepen their industry knowledge. However, the marginal benefits of product similarity to analysts may fall as firms with similar products may generate less demand for analyst research from investors due to potentially better information environment for these firms.
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Further, product similarity also embodies product market competition. Through different channels, competition may have ambiguous effects on firms' information environment, performance, and survivability, making firms more or less attractive for analysts to cover. 6 For forecast accuracy and dispersion, the above-mentioned information spillover through product similarity should enhance analysts' industry knowledge and help them better understand the performance 5 Prior research suggests that analysts primarily interpret information as opposed to producing new information (e.g., Lang and Lundholm [1996] , Francis, Schipper, and Vincent [2002] , Frankel, Kothari, and Weber [2006] , De Franco and Hope [2011] ). Also, these studies find that analyst coverage is increasing in firms' disclosure quality. The issue of decreased demand may therefore be secondary. 6 For example, competition could amplify the information spillover through product similarity (e.g., Holmstrom [1982] , Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983] , Hart [1983] , and Scharfstein [1988] ). Competition also has ambiguous effects on firms' voluntary disclosure, which affects analysts' information environment (e.g., Grossman [1981] , Milgrom [1981] , and Verrecchia [1983] ). Competition may stimulate innovation and total factor productivity and thus affect long term performance and survivability of firms (e.g., Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter [2007] , Olley and Pakes [1996] , Nickell [1996] , and Aghion et al. [2008] ), while lowering the profitability of firms and increase the bankruptcy risks (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein [1990] , Mazzeo [2002] , Seim [2006] , Hoberg and Phillips [2010a, 2010b] ). Competition has ambiguous effects on managerial incentive plans, which affect firm performance (e.g., Schmidt [1997] , Hermalin [1992] , and Raith [2003] ).
of firms under coverage, and thus increasing the convergence about firm valuations. The information spillover also means that analysts may put less weight on their private information. Following firms with similar products may therefore help analysts issue more accurate and less dispersed forecasts. However, these effects may attenuate as the marginal benefits from product similarity to analysts fall. Also, if competition increases the uncertainty faced by firms, product similarity may also produce opposite effects.
For career outcomes, the net impact of product similarity should be highly consistent with that for analyst following, because analysts make coverage decisions based on how product similarity affects their career outcomes.
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In sum, the effect of product similarity on analysts' forecast accuracy and dispersion, career outcomes, and coverage decisions is ambiguous and thus an empirical question.
Combining web crawling and text parsing algorithms that process the text of product descriptions in 10-K annual filings, Hoberg and Phillips [2010b] calculate firm-by-firm pairwise similarity scores as a
Hotelling-like product location space to directly quantify a dynamic, firm-specific relationship between any two firms in terms of product similarity. Since these scores change dynamically whenever a firm changes its product description, the HP index also allows us to investigate the effect of changes in a firm's product similarity over time on changes in analyst coverage decisions and changes in forecast properties.
We conduct our analysis at three levels: 1) analyst coverage and analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion at the firm level, 2) analyst coverage and relative forecast accuracy at the analyst-firm level, and 3) analyst career outcomes at the analyst level. We conduct tests at these different levels for several reasons. First, firm-level analysis is too coarse to directly study how the similarity between a firm's products relative to those of the other firms in a given analyst's portfolio affects the analyst's decision to add or drop coverage of the firm, and the analyst's relative accuracy in comparison to the other analysts covering the same firm. Direct analysis is only feasible at the analyst-firm level, and is equivalent to studying analysts' portfolio management decisions. However, little direct evidence exists on how 7 Note that improved forecast accuracy may not necessarily be associated with increased analyst coverage or improved career outcomes for analysts because forecast accuracy is only one factor affecting coverage decisions and career outcomes. For example, if product similarity improves analyst forecast accuracy for a firm but dramatically reduces investor demand for analyst research, analysts may choose not to follow the firm. Thus, investigating forecast accuracy does not amount to corroborating results for analyst coverage and career outcomes.
analysts select portfolio companies, which should be very important to analysts, as it is for other participants in the capital market such as fund managers. Second, examining whether covering firms with similar products improves analysts' career outcomes is only feasible at the analyst level. Third, tests at different levels for the same analyst characteristic provide robustness checks. Taken together, these analyses provide more direct and robust evidence of how product similarity affects analysts. Note that our earlier discussion about how product similarity may affect each aspect related to analysts (i.e., coverage decisions, forecast properties, and career outcomes) applies to all the levels of our analysis that examine those aspects (e.g., coverage decision at both firm and analyst-firm levels).
We begin our analysis at the firm level. We find a positive and significant impact of a firm's product similarity on the number of analysts covering the firm and of changes in a firm's product similarity on changes in the number of analysts covering the firm. We further find that analyst forecasts are more accurate and less dispersed for firms with more similar products, and that changes in a firm's product similarity are positively related to changes in forecast accuracy and negatively related to changes in forecast dispersion. We also observe that the positive impact of product similarity on analyst coverage and forecast accuracy attenuates as product similarity increases.
At the analyst-firm level, we find that analysts are more likely to drop a firm from (add a firm to) coverage if the firm's products are less (more) similar to those of the other firms in the analyst's portfolio, with the relation showing a noticeable concave shape. Further, an analyst's forecast accuracy is greater than that of the other analysts covering the same firm when the firm is more similar to the other firms in the analyst's portfolios, with the effect of product similarity attenuating with its own level. Finally, at the analyst level, we find that analysts with portfolios of firms with more similar products are less likely to be fired and are more likely to be nominated Institutional Investor all-stars, with the impact of product similarity again attenuating with its own level.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, our study contributes to the literature on analyst behavior by showing that product similarity plays an important role in analysts' industry specialization. Consistent with Chamberlin [1933] and Hotelling [1929] , who show that product differentiation is fundamental to industrial organization, our evidence (e.g., career outcomes) suggests that analysts have incentives to cover firms with similar products to benefit from information spillover and enhanced industry knowledge. Using survey-based evidence, Brown et al. [2013] show that analysts consistently rank industry knowledge as the most important determinant of their compensation and the most important input in their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. Our large-sample archival evidence complements their survey-based evidence on the importance of industry knowledge to analysts and sheds new light on analysts' decision processes. Second, our study contributes to the analyst coverage literature by being the first, to the best of our knowledge, to examine how analysts select firms in their portfolios, which can be directly studied only at the analyst-firm level. Our study therefore helps fill the gap noted by Beyer et al. [2010, p329] : "Despite the numerous empirical studies documenting the association between the degree of analyst following and firm characteristics, we still do not know the factors that analysts consider when making this decision, and how the incentives faced by the analyst and/or the composition of the analyst's portfolio of followed firms shape this decision. Moreover, the role of the firm's existing information environment is unclear".
Third, our analysis on product similarity and its change further contributes to the analyst coverage literature by documenting beyond mere associations. Numerous studies examine the determinants of analyst coverage decisions, focusing largely on the effect of disclosure decisions (e.g., Lang and Lundholm [1996] ) or accounting comparability (e.g., De Franco, Kathori, and Verdi [2011] ). While these studies are thoughtfully executed, they face a severe obstacle in establishing causality from their focal variables to coverage decisions. For example, analysts may influence firms to improve disclosure quality or make accounting information more comparable (e.g., Jung [2010] ). However, while firm managers might have various motives to change, say, accounting disclosure practices to cater to analysts and other capital market players, it is difficult to imagine that firms would change product strategies (e.g., product composition and 8 Our study focuses on an analyst's knowledge of economic factors affecting the performance of firms in one or a few related industries, and the analyst's ability to value and rank firms within these related industries. Brokerage houses may also employ strategists who are specialized in ranking industries relative to the market or each other (e.g., Kadan et al. [2012] ); these macro-level specialists are not in the scope of our analysis.
consequent product market competition) to influence analysts' coverage decisions. Our focus on product similarly therefore allows us to draw more powerful inferences about factors driving coverage decisions.
Finally, we contribute to the information spillover literature by directly measuring product similarity and testing its impact. This direct measure overcomes several limitations if fixed industry classifications were used as the proxy for product similarity. Prior research shows that analysts benefit from intra-industry information externalities without focusing on product similarity, and the existing analysis is based on fixed industry classifications, such as Standard Industry Classification (SIC).
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However, if we assume that prior research actually studies product similarity, as a measure of product similarity, fixed industry classifications are at best coarse and at worst irrelevant. For instance, fixed industry classifications may proxy for constructs other than product similarity.
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Further, they cannot easily accommodate entirely new product markets, 11 nor can they continuously measure the within-or between-industry distance of firm-specific pairwise product similarity as they classify firms to industries on a zero-one basis. Fixed industry classifications also assume product similarity and product markets to be time-invariant, which does not account for the fact that firms' industry structure and competition strategies are likely dynamic rather than static.
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Our focus on product similarity therefore complements literature by painting a more complete picture of analysts' information environment.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design and sample. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
Hypotheses
In this section, we develop three sets of hypotheses on the effect of product similarity on 1)
analysts' coverage, forecast accuracy, and forecast dispersion at the firm level, 2) analysts' add/drop coverage decisions and relative accuracy at the analyst-firm level, and 3) analysts' career outcomes at the analyst level.
Our first set of hypotheses examines whether product similarity enhances analyst coverage and influences analyst forecast properties at the firm level. As discussed in Bhushan [1989] and Lang and Lundholm [1996] , the number of analysts covering a firm is a function of analysts' costs and benefits. As we discuss earlier, product similarity can affect the cost and benefit of coverage to analysts. If there is an overall benefit for analysts to follow a firm with high product similarity, we expect the number of analysts covering a firm to increase with the firm's product similarity. This leads to Hypothesis 1a:
H1a: The number of analysts covering a firm increases with the firm's product similarity.
The null hypothesis is that the number of analysts covering a firm decreases or has no relation to a firm's product similarity.
We next examine whether product similarity is associated with two properties of analyst forecasts -accuracy and dispersion. As mentioned above, analysts may better understand the business model and business environment of firms with higher product similarity. Enhanced industry knowledge should improve analysts' ability to forecast earnings and thus lead to greater forecast accuracy. In addition, analysts who cover firms with similar products likely examine similar information and develop consistent methods for evaluating these firms (Fleischer and Baum [2010] , Zuckerman [2004] ). Analysts may therefore put less weight on their private information, leading to reduced forecast dispersion. Our Hypotheses 1b and 1c are thus:
H1b: Analyst forecast accuracy increases with a firm's product similarity.
H1c: Analyst forecast dispersion decreases with a firm's product similarity.
The null hypotheses are that there is no relationship between forecast properties and product similarity or that higher product similarity leads to lower accuracy and higher dispersion. H2a: Analysts are more likely to drop firms that are less similar to other firms in their portfolios.
H2b: Analysts are more likely to add firms that are more similar to other firms in their portfolios.
The null hypotheses are that product similarity has no impact on analysts' add or drop decisions or that product similarity reduces (increases) the likelihood of analysts adding firms to (dropping firms from) their portfolios.
We also examine the relation between product similarity and analysts' relative accuracy at the analyst-firm level. Our hypothesis is as follows.
H2c: Analysts make more accurate earnings forecasts for a firm relative to the other analysts covering the same firm when the firm is more similar to other firms in their portfolios.
The null hypothesis is that product similarity has no impact on or reduces analysts' relative accuracy.
Finally, we consider the relation between product similarity and analysts' career outcomes at the analyst level. We expect the net impact of product similarity on career outcomes to be highly consistent with that for analyst following, because analysts likely make coverage decisions based on how product similarity affects their career outcomes. In particular, as mentioned above, product similarity should help Team has a significant effect on analyst compensation (Stickel [1992] , Michaely and Womack [1999] , and Hong, Kubik, and Solomon [2000] ). Our last hypothesis is thus:
H3: Analysts with higher product similarity firms in their portfolio have better career outcomes than their peers.
The null hypothesis is that higher portfolio similarity has no relation to or is associated with worse career outcomes.
Research Design and Sample

FIRM-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF ANALYST COVERAGE, FORECAST ACCURACY, AND FORECAST DISPERSION
At the firm level, we employ a standardized version of the total similarity measure provided by Hoberg and Phillips [2010b] . Combining web crawling and text parsing algorithms that process the text of product descriptions in 10-K annual filings using cosine similarity methodology, Hoberg and Phillips
[2010b] calculate firm-by-firm pairwise similarity scores.
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For firm i, they subtract a minimum 13 Business descriptions in firms' 10-K filings are legally required to be accurate and up-to-date. The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Regulation S-K requires that firms describe the significant products they offer to the market, and that these descriptions be updated and representative of the current fiscal year of the 10-K.
threshold from each pairwise similarity score between firm i and all the other firms to obtain net pairwise similarity scores, then sum up the resulting net similarity scores that are above zero, and then they multiply this sum plus one (self-similarity score for firm i) by 100 to obtain the total similarity index (which we refer to as the HP index) for firm i.
14 Note that the index can change from year to year, given changes in the product descriptions of firm i or of firms with products similar to those of firm i.
To examine how product similarity affects the number of analysts covering a firm (H1a) 
where Coverage is the number of analysts who issue annual earnings forecasts for firm i in year t. As we show later, the raw measure of the HP index is skewed. We therefore use a standardized HP index, RSimilarity, which is the decile rank from 0 to 9 based on the raw HP index for firm i in year t divided by 9.
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If analysts benefit from following firms with high product similarity, we expect β 1 to be positive.
We control for a variety of variables that prior literature suggests could affect firms' information environment and business complexity, and consequently analyst coverage decisions. Unless otherwise stated, the control variables are measured at the end of the prior fiscal year. We first include the logarithm of the market value of equity (Ln (Market Cap)), which has been found to be an important determinant of analyst coverage (e.g., Bhushan [1989] We also include Return Volatility, the standard deviation of firm monthly stock returns for the fiscal year,
as Bhushan [1989] and Lehavy, Li, and Merkley [2011] suggest that while return volatility makes private information more valuable and thus should be positively related to the demand for analyst services, it could also increase the cost of coverage. for the current fiscal year in millions of shares. We additionally include an indicator for loss firms (Loss Firms), as such firms may be less attractive to analysts because they are associated with lower profitability and higher bankruptcy risk. However, loss firms could create higher demand for information from analysts since these firms face greater uncertainty. Finally, we include year fixed effects and industry fixed 16 O'Brien and Bhushan [1990] suggest that analyst following and institutional ownership are potentially endogenous, whereas Frankel, Kothari, and Weber [2006] assume that the two variables are exogenous. Following Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols [2001] , we examine our results with and without institutional holdings and its lagged value. Our results are robust to the alternative specifications.
affects based on the Fama and French [1997] 48 industry classification and adjust for heteroskedasticity and clustering by both firm and year in all the firm-level regressions (i.e., Equations (1)- (4)).
To examine how changes in product similarity affect changes in the number of analysts covering a firm, we estimate the firm-level regression
in which we take the first difference of every variable in Equation (1) except the standard deviation of returns. If the benefit from product similarity dominates the cost related to product similarity, then analysts should actively respond to changes in firms' product strategy through changes in their coverage decisions, that is, we expect β 1 to be positive in Equation (2). Note that Equation (2) tests a different aspect of H1a from Equation (1). Year-to-year changes in variables provide a separate test of causal relations than do levels of those variables. Here we examine whether more analysts decide to cover a firm that experiences increases in product similarity.
Next, we test the relationship between product similarity and analyst forecast properties (H1b and H1c) using the following firm-level regression:
Forecast Property is either forecast accuracy (Accuracy) or forecast dispersion (Dispersion). Accuracy is defined as the negative of the absolute difference between I/B/E/S reported actual earnings and the last consensus analyst forecast before the annual earnings announcement, scaled by the share price at the prior fiscal year-end. Dispersion is the standard deviation of the last individual analyst forecast before the annual earnings announcement, scaled by the share price at the prior fiscal year-end. Following previous research (e.g., Lang and Lundholm [1996] , Duru and Reeb [2002] ), we also control for the absolute value of the change in earnings per share from the prior to the current year (|ΔEPS|). If product similarity enhances analysts' ability to forecast earnings and increases convergence among analysts about how to value the firm, we expect β 1 to be positive for Accuracy and negative for Dispersion.
Similar to above, we also use a firm-level regression to examine how changes in product similarity affect changes in analyst forecast properties:
in which we take the first difference of every variable in Equation (3) except the standard deviation of returns. If product similarity helps analysts issue more accurate forecasts and increases convergence in their opinions about future earnings, we should find a positive β 1 in Equation (4).
To capture the potential non-linear relationship between product similarity and analyst coverage or forecast properties, we also re-estimate Equations (1) to (4) 
ANALYST-FIRM-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF ANALYST COVERAGE AND RELATIVE ACCURACY
To investigate the impact of product similarity on an analyst's decision to drop a firm from coverage (H2a), we estimate the following analyst-firm level logit model:
where Drop ijt is equal to one if firm i was covered by analyst j in year t but not in year t+1, and zero if firm i was covered by analyst j in both years. Thus, in this test our sample consists of firms covered by analysts in year t and we examine whether an analyst drops a firm from coverage in the next year.
We calculate product similarity at the analyst-firm level using two measures, DSimilarity ijt and more similar to other firms within analyst j's portfolio, given the fact that for another firm to enter the calculation of firm i's HP index, the similarity score between them has to be larger than the minimum similarity threshold according to the design of the HP index. Although PSimilarity ijt seems to provide more granularity than DSimilarity ijt when measuring the degree of similarity between a given firm (firm i) and other firms in analyst j's portfolio in year t, in reality it may or may not because it cannot account for the pairwise degree of similarity between firm i and each of the other firms that enter firm i's HP index.
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If the benefit from product similarity dominates the cost related to product similarity, we expect β 1 to be negative.
To investigate the impact of product similarity on an analyst's decision to add a firm to his portfolio (H2b), we use the following analyst-firm level logit model:
where Add ijt is equal to one if firm i was not covered by analyst j in year t-1 but is covered in year t, and zero if firm i was not covered by analyst j in either year t-1 or year t. If analysts randomly choose firms to follow, any firm from the overall population not covered by analyst j in either year t-1 or t can be in our Add=0 sample. We call this overall Add=0 sample Pool A. However, since the number of firms in Pool A is very large, the number of observations for regressions at the firm-analyst-year level would be huge.
To ensure that any significant result is not caused by a very large number of observations, we use a restricted benchmark sample, which we call Pool B, whereby we include only the firms from Pool A that appear in the calculation of the HP index for existing firms in analyst j's portfolio. Note that this choice 17 As we mention in note 14, seven firms appear in IBM's HP index calculation in 2000. 18 Unfortunately, the publicly available data from Hoberg and Phillips do not provide such a level of granularity. For example, we know only the identity of the firms that enter IBM's HP index calculation, but we do not have the pairwise degree of similarity between IBM and each of the other firms that enter IBM's HP index calculation.
(i.e., reduce the Add=0 sample from Pool A to Pool B) works against finding the expected results since benchmark firms (i.e., Add ijt =0 firms) in Pool B are already similar to existing firms in the analyst's portfolio.
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In regression (6), PSimilarity ijt is defined as above; again, it measures the degree of similarity between a given firm (firm i) and existing firms in analyst j's portfolio in year t. We cannot use DSimilarity ijt in the add decision regression with Pool B, however, because all the sample firms are required to appear in the HP index calculation of existing firms within analyst j's portfolio (i.e., DSimilarity ijt equals one for all our benchmark firms in Pool B).
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If the benefit from product similarity dominates the cost related to product similarity, we expect β 1 to be positive in Equation (6).
To control for the potential effects of various firm characteristics on analysts' decisions to add a firm to (drop a firm from) coverage, we include the same baseline controls as defined in our firm-level analyses.
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We adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and clustering by analyst, firm, and year in Equation (5) and Equation (6). We do not include fixed effects in the regressions because the coefficient estimates of fixed effect logit models are inconsistent (e.g., Greene [1997] , Greene [2004] ), but our results are not affected by adding industry and year fixed effects.
To examine the impact of product similarity on forecast accuracy at the analyst-firm level (H2c), we estimate the following regression: 
We create our measure of analyst forecast relative accuracy following Hong and Kubik [2003] . Using a 19 Our results are stronger when we use Pool A to run the Add decision regression. As further robustness checks, we form two additional subsamples from Pool A. For the first subsample, we randomly choose the same number of firms from Pool A as our Add=0 sample. For the second subsample, we select the same number of firms from Pool A matched by firm size and book-to-market as in the Add=1 sample. In both cases, we obtain similar results. 20 As a robustness check, we test DSimilarity ijt in the add decision regression using Pool A. Our conclusion is unaffected. 21 In our baseline models (5) and (6), we follow prior literature to not include analyst characteristics because it is not clear how analyst characteristics affect analysts' decisions to add or drop a firm. However, our results are not affected when we include analyst characteristics such as broker size and analyst experience.
relative measure instead of a raw measure mitigates the effects of common shocks that affect all analysts covering a firm at a given point in time and hence helps us focus on analysts' relative performance; using a relative measure also facilitates comparison with prior literature, which typically uses a similar approach.
Analysts who cover a particular firm in a year are first ranked based on their forecast accuracy on the firm (absolute value of the difference between the latest analyst forecast prior to the earnings announcement and actual earnings). If more than one analyst has the same accuracy and thus rank on firm i, we assign each of these analysts the average of their ranks. The relative accuracy of analyst j on firm i, Relative
Accuracy ijt , is 1 -(Rank ijt -1) / (# of Analysts it -1), where # of Analysts it is the total number of analysts covering firm i.
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If product similarity increases analysts' forecast accuracy, we expect β 1 in Equation (7) to be positive. Breadth is similar to Relative Accuracy but based on the number of firms covered by the analyst.
Relative Boldness is similar to Relative Accuracy but based on the absolute value of the distance between the analyst's forecast and the consensus (defined as the average of the other analysts' forecasts). We include an indicator variable (Star) equal to one if the analyst is on Institutional Investor magazine's all-star list, and zero otherwise. Relative Firm Experience is similar to Relative Accuracy but based on the number of years the analyst has covered the firm.
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Broker Size is the number of analysts employed by the brokerage house of the analyst. Relative Horizon is similar to Relative Accuracy but based on the number of days between the forecast date and the subsequent annual earnings announcement date. We also include year fixed effects and adjust for heteroskedasticity and clustering by analyst, firm, and year in 22 Because analysts who follow thinly covered firms or very few firms are more likely to have a more extreme relative forecast accuracy measure (Hong and Kubik [2003] ), as a robustness check we exclude analysts covering fewer than three firms or firms with fewer than three analysts in our analysis. Our results are unaffected. 23 Our results are unaffected when we control for analysts' general experience (i.e., the number of years the analyst has issued forecasts in I/B/E/S database) and industry experience (i.e., the number of years the analyst has issued forecasts for the industry). Equation (7). 
ANALYST-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF CAREER OUTCOMES
We next assess the effect of product similarity on analysts' career outcomes at the analyst level.
To measure product similarity at the analyst level, we create two portfolio density indexes, DDensity jt and PDensity jt , by averaging the analyst-firm-level similarity indexes, DSimilarity ijt and PSimilarity ijt , respectively, across firms within analyst j's portfolio. These measures proxy for the degree of similarity among firms within analyst j's portfolio. The larger are DDensity jt and PDensity jt , the more similar are firms within analyst j's portfolio.
We use the following analyst-level regressions to examine the impact of product similarity on the career outcomes of analysts (H3): analysts' career outcomes, we expect β 1 to be negative and positive in Equations (8) and (9), respectively. We include several analyst-level variables to control for other factors that might affect analyst 24 Following prior research, we do not include firm characteristics or firm and industry fixed effects in Equation (7) because we focus on the relative accuracy measure that is already normalized within each firm instead of the raw accuracy measure. Our results are not affected when we include broker fixed effects and the industry and general experience of analysts. 25 Note that although some analyst departures from the I/B/E/S database may not be due to termination but instead to voluntary careers changes (such as moving to the buy side), such alternatives work to make it more difficult for us to find the expected results. 27 Although we include all the analysts in I/B/E/S during this period, we also conduct all our tests for only the analysts that appear in I/B/E/S for the first time after 1983 to avoid any left-censored bias for experience. In untabulated results, we find very similar results to those reported in our paper. Panel B of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the key variables at the analyst-firm level for both the add and drop decision regressions. These variables seem to be largely well distributed. For drop decisions, about 30% of firms covered by an analyst in one year are dropped from coverage the next year (= 121,229 / (121,229 + 270,758) ). Given that analysts generally cover a similar number of firms across years, this implies turnover of about 30% of firms each year in the average analyst's portfolio. For add decisions, about 1% of firms not covered by an analyst in one year become covered the next year (=110,343 / (110,343 + 11,077,024)). These percentages are essentially the unconditional probability of firms being dropped from and added to analyst coverage, respectively. By comparing observations within three subportfolios (newly covered firms (Add ijt =1), firms with continued coverage (Drop ijt =0), and firms dropped from coverage (Drop ijt =1), we can see that analysts change a large proportion of their portfolios every year. Panel B also shows that the mean (median) Relative Accuracy is 0.50. 
Empirical Results
FIRM-LEVEL ANALYSIS
Analyst Coverage
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report results from estimating Equation (1). The coefficient estimate on RSimilarity in column 1 is positive and significant, which suggests that analyst coverage is greater for firms with greater product similarity.
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The economic effect is such that increasing product similarity from the lowest decile to the highest decile increases the number of analysts covering a firm by two, which is about 26% of the mean analyst coverage (i.e., 2.07, the coefficient on RSimilarity, divided by 7.95, mean analyst coverage). Our results support H1a, suggesting that there is a net benefit for analysts to follow firms with high product similarity. Column 2 shows that while the coefficient estimate on RSimilarity is still positive and significant, the coefficient estimate on its square term, RSimilarity 2 , is negative and significant, suggesting that the net benefit of product similarity for analysts attenuates as product similarity continues to increase.
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with prior research (e.g., Lehavy, Li, and Merkley [2011] ). The only exception is the insignificant coefficient estimate on R&D Intensity due to our correction of standard errors for clustering by both year and firm, in comparison to the correction for clustering by firm only in their paper.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 report results from estimating Equation (2). The results show that changes in product similarity, ΔRSimilarity, are positively related to the changes in analyst coverage,
ΔCoverage, which suggests that analysts consider the benefits of product similarity in their coverage decisions, actively adjusting their portfolio to changes in firms' businesses. Many of the control variables are statistically significant and their signs are consistent with those in the level regressions in columns 1 and 2. The results provide further support for the finding of net beneficial effects to firms with greater product similarity and analysts covering similar firms.
Forecast Accuracy and Dispersion
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 report results from estimating Equation (3), which tests the relationship between product similarity and forecast properties. The coefficient estimates on RSimilarity are positive and significant for Accuracy and negative and significant for Dispersion, which suggests that product similarity improves the information environment of firms and in turn analysts, leading to increased forecast accuracy and reduced forecast dispersion.
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In economic terms, increasing product similarity 29 Note that Table 1 Panel A shows that the distributions of Accuracy and Dispersion are skewed. As a robustness check, we form SqAccu, which is the signed square of Accuracy, and SqDisp, which is the square of Dispersion. We do not use the log transformation because Accuracy and Dispersion can be negative, zero, or very close to zero. We re-estimate Equation (3) using SqAccu and SqDisp instead of Accuracy and Dispersion. Our results are qualitatively from the lowest decile to the highest decile increases accuracy by about 33% of the mean Accuracy and decreases dispersion by 33% of the mean Dispersion.
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These results support H1b and H1c.
We also investigate potential nonlinearity in the above findings. Untabulated results show that the coefficient estimate on RSimilarity is still positive and significant for Accuracy, whereas that on RSimilarity 2 is negative and weakly significant, providing weak evidence that the net benefit of product similarity to forecast accuracy declines as product similarity increases. However, we do not find such a nonlinear relationship between product similarity and Dispersion; the coefficient estimate on RSimilarity 2 is insignificant.
The results for the control variables are consistent with prior research. Firms with a better information environment (e.g., firms with greater institutional holdings) exhibit greater accuracy and lower dispersion in their forecasts. Analysts covering firms with greater uncertainty (e.g., firms with greater return volatility), loss firms, and firms with greater earnings changes are associated with lower forecast accuracy and greater dispersion.
Columns 3 and 4 of In addition, we follow Barron et al. [1998] to derive two forecast measures of "analyst uncertainty"
and "analyst consensus." Higher (lower) levels of "analyst uncertainty" correspond to lower (higher) levels of precision in individual analysts' total information set, whereas higher (lower) levels of "analyst consensus" correspond to a higher (lower) proportion of common information in the total information that analysts impound in their forecasts. In untabulated results, we find that RSimilarity is associated with lower overall uncertainty (coefficient=-0.002, z-statistic =-2.50) and a higher common proportion (coefficient =0.05, z-statistic=3.95), which provides further support for the positive impact of product similarity on analysts' information environment.
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Finally, our Table 4 results hold when we control for the number of analysts covering the firms (Coverage).
31 De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi [2011] argue that accounting comparability can decrease search and processing costs and attract more analyst coverage. We get 26,249 observations for the firm-level analysis after merging with their ACCTCOMP data. 32 In a firm-level analysis, Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols [2001] use the number of firms within an industry (based on the 4-digit SIC code) to proxy for information spillover; theirs seems to be the only paper using this approach. Nonetheless, we include the number of firms within an industry, Industry_N it , in Equation (1). We find that although Industry_N it is positive and significant when included alone, similar to what Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols [2001] show, it becomes insignificant after we also include RSimilarity it (though RSimilarity it is still significant). We also do not find significant results for changes in Industry_N it in the change regression (Equation (2)).
ANALYST-FIRM-LEVEL ANALYSIS
Coverage Decisions
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present the results of the logit model in Equation (5) for analysts' drop decisions. The coefficient estimates on both DSimilarity ijt and PSimilarity ijt are negative and significant, suggesting that analysts are less likely to drop firms that are more similar to other firms in their portfolios 33 .
In untabulated results, we find that increasing DSimilarity ijt from zero to one decreases a firm's probability of being dropped by approximately 8%. Given that Panel B of Table 1 shows that the unconditional probability of being dropped from analyst portfolios is 31%, the result here is equivalent to 26% (= 8% / 31%) of the unconditional probability of being dropped. Further, a one standard deviation increase in PSimilarity ijt decreases a firm's probability of being dropped by approximately 2.58%, which is equivalent to approximately 8% (= 2.58% / 31%) of the unconditional probability of being dropped. These results support H2a.
Column 3 of Table 5 presents results of the logit model in Equation (6) for analysts' add decisions.
The mean coefficient on PSimilarity ijt is positive and significant, suggesting that analysts are more likely to add firms that are more similar to existing firms in their portfolios.
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In untabulated results, we find that a one standard deviation increase in PSimilarity ijt increases a firm's probability of being added by approximately 0.06%. Given that Panel B of Table 1 shows that the unconditional probability of being added to analyst portfolios is 1.0%, a one standard deviation increase in PSimilarity ijt increases a firm's probability of being added to coverage by about 6% (= 0.06% / 1.0%). These results support H2b.
Taken together, our results from both the add and the drop decision regressions suggest that analysts actively adapt to the product similarity of covered firms in order to keep the firms in their portfolio similar.
In untabulated results, we find that the coefficient estimate on PSimilarity is negative and significant, whereas its square term PSimilarity 2 is positive and significant in the Drop regression. The mean coefficient on PSimilarity is positive and significant in the Add regression, whereas the mean 33 In untabulated results, we find that DSimilarity ijt and PSimilarity ijt are negative and highly significant in each year's regression. 34 In untabulated results, we also find that PSimilarity ijt is positive and highly significant in each year's regression. coefficient on its square term PSimilarity 2 becomes negative and significant. These results suggest that the net benefit of covering a firm declines when the firm becomes too similar to other firms in the analyst's portfolio.
The other variables are mostly consistent with our expectations. For example, firms with large size, more institutional holdings, and more management forecasts are less likely to be dropped by analysts, whereas firms with higher return volatility and loss firms are more likely to be dropped by analysts. We almost always find the opposite sign for the control variables in the add decision regression. These results are consistent with the idea that analysts consciously decide whether to cover individual firms on the basis of both the benefit and the cost of covering the firm.
To examine whether product similarity plays a unique role in analysts' industry expertise and coverage decisions, we control for analyst specialization defined along different industry classifications (two-digit and three-digit SIC, GICS, and various Fama and French industries). Following prior studies (e.g., Jacobs, Lys, and Neale [1999]), we calculate industry specialization for firm i, analyst j as the percentage of firms in analyst j's portfolio that come from the same industry as firm i. Our product similarity measures remain highly significant after controlling for fixed industry specialization. Table 6 reports results from estimating Equation (7). Columns 1 and 2 show that the coefficients on DSimilarity and PSimilarity are both positive and significant, which suggests that an analyst issues more accurate forecasts on a firm relative to other analysts covering the same firm when the firm is more similar to other firms in the portfolio, consistent with H2c. In untabulated results, we find a nonlinear relationship between product similarity and relative accuracy. The coefficient estimate on PSimilarity 2 is negative and significant, suggesting that the net benefit of product similarity decreases when the firm's products are too similar to those of the other firms in the analyst's portfolio. 35 The significance of these fixed industry specialization measures varies across classification schemes. Those based on the GICS industry classification outperform the rest, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler [2003] , Boni and Womack [2006] ) showing that GICS is a better proxy for industry specialization.
Relative Accuracy
We also estimate the effect of product similarity on relative accuracy at the analyst level. We regress the mean relative forecast accuracy across all firms within an analyst's portfolio on our analyst-level similarity measure (DDensity or PDensity) and the same control variables as in Equation (8).
Our results (untabulated) show that the coefficients on DDensity and PDensity are significantly positive (z-statistics equal to 8.11 and 6.41, respectively). Thus, we find additional evidence suggesting that analysts issue relatively more accurate forecasts when their portfolios consist of firms that are more similar to each other. Table 7 presents results of estimating firing outcomes (i.e., Equation (8)). The coefficients on DDensity and PDensity are both negative and significant, which suggests that analysts with a higher density portfolio of stocks are less likely to be fired. In untabulated results, we find that a one standard deviation increase in DDensity and PDensity decreases an analyst's probability of being fired by approximately 1.3% and 1.1%, respectively. Given that Panel C of Table 1 shows that the unconditional probability of being fired is 17%, a one standard deviation increase in DDensity and PDensity decrease the unconditional probability of being fired by approximately 8% (= 1.3% / 17%) and 6 % (= 1.1% / 17%), respectively. Table 8 presents results of estimating all-star status (i.e., Equation (9)). The coefficients on DDensity and PDensity are both positive and significant, which means that analysts with a higher density portfolio of stocks are more likely to be voted all-stars. In untabulated results, we find that a one standard deviation increase in DDensity and PDensity increases an analyst's probability of being an all-star by approximately 0.9% and 0.3%, respectively. Given that Panel C of Table 1 shows that the unconditional probability of being an all-star is 7%, a one standard deviation increase in DDensity and PDensity increases the unconditional probability of being an all-star by approximately 13% (= 0.9% / 7%) and 2% (= 0.3% / 7%), respectively. These results support H3.
ANALYSIS OF CAREER OUTCOMES AT THE ANALYST LEVEL
The signs for the control variables are largely consistent with expectations. For example, all-star analysts in the previous year, experienced analysts, and analysts with higher relative forecast accuracy are less likely to be fired and more likely to be an all-star this year. The results overall suggest that portfolio density improves analysts' career outcomes.
We also include square terms (DDensity 2 and PDensity 2 ) to test the potential nonlinear relationship.
In untabulated results, we find that that DDensity and PDensity remain significant and have the same sign as respective tables, whereas DDensity 2 and PDensity 2 are significant and have the opposite sign to those of DDensity and PDensity, respectively. Thus, the benefit of product similarity on career outcomes appears to decline with an increase in portfolio density (i.e., the degree of product similarity among firms covered by an analyst).
Our analyst-level estimation results are robust to excluding analysts covering fewer than three firms or firms with fewer than three analysts from our analysis, or to excluding relative accuracy from
Equations (8) and (9). Our results also hold when we control for fixed industry specialization (based on two-digit and three-digit SIC, GICS, and various Fama and French industries) by adding a variable that measures the largest percentage of firms in the portfolio that come from the same industry (e.g., Boni and Womack [2006] ). Finally, we also test the effect of portfolio density on the likelihood an analyst moves to a large brokerage house (with at least 25 analysts). Untabulated results show that both DDensity and PDensity are positive and significant at conventional levels, providing further support for the positive effect of product similarity on analysts' career outcomes.
Conclusion
In this study, we examine the effect of product similarity on financial analysts. We find that firms with greater product similarity are associated with greater analyst coverage, higher forecast accuracy, and smaller forecast dispersion. Changes in product similarity are also positively related to changes in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy, and negatively related to changes in forecast dispersion. These beneficial effects of product similarity decrease, however, with its own level.
We further find that analysts purposefully adjust their portfolios to adapt to changes in product similarity. Analysts add a firm to (drop a firm from) their portfolios if the firm's products are more (less) similar to the remaining firms in their portfolios. These results reveal that analysts consider product similarity in their portfolio management decisions. We also find that analysts make more accurate forecasts on a firm relative to other analysts covering the same firm when the firm is more similar in products to other firms in their portfolios. Finally, we find that there is a positive relationship between product similarity among firms in an analyst's portfolio and the analyst's career outcomes.
Overall, our results at the firm, analyst-firm, and analyst levels consistently suggest that the benefits from product similarity dominate the related costs to analysts. Firms with greater product similarity appear to have a better information environment, and analysts covering firms with products similar to other firms in their portfolios provide more accurate forecasts and enjoy better career outcomes.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the portfolio management decisions of analysts. Our results suggest that product similarity plays an important role in analysts' industry specialization.
APPENDIX Variable Definitions Panel A: Firm Level Variables
Coverage
Number of analysts providing annual earnings forecasts for the firm.
Similarity
The HP index, i.e., total similarity measure (TNIC3TSIMM) from Hoberg and Phillips [2010b] .
RSimilarity
Decile ranks of 0-9 based on the HP index each year divided by 9.
Ln (Market Cap)
Natural logarithm of market value of equity, which equals to number of shares outstanding (CSHO) times the share prices at the prior fiscal year end (PRCC_F).
Book-to-Market
Ratio of book value of equity (SEQ) over market value of equity (CSHO* PRCC_F) at the prior fiscal year end.
Inst. Holdings
Percentage of institutional ownership at the prior fiscal year end.
Return Volatility
Standard deviation of a firm's monthly stock returns in the prior fiscal year.
Ln (#Segments)
Natural logarithm of the number of reported business segments in the Compustat segment file at the prior fiscal year end.
# Mgt. Forecasts
Number of management earnings forecasts issued in the fiscal year.
R&D Intensity
Research and development expense (XRD) as a percentage of operating expense (XOPR) at the prior fiscal year end. Advertising Intensity Advertising expense (XAD) as a percentage of operating expense at the prior fiscal year end.
Share Volume
Share volume (CSHTR_F) in millions of shares in the fiscal year.
Loss Firms
Indicator that is one if earnings per share (EPSFX) are negative, and zero otherwise.
|ΔEPS|
The absolute value of the difference between the prior two years' earnings per share (EPSFX) deflated by share price at the prior fiscal year end.
Accuracy
Negative of the absolute value of the difference between I/B/E/S actual earnings and the latest consensus forecast prior to earnings announcements, scaled by share price at the prior fiscal year end.
Dispersion
Standard deviation of individual analyst forecasts in the latest consensus forecasts prior to earnings announcements, scaled by share price at the fiscal year end.
Panel B: Analyst-Firm Level Variables
Add Indicator variable that is one if firm i was not covered by analyst j in year t-1 but is covered in year t, and zero if firm i was not covered by analyst j in either year t-1 or t. Drop Indicator variable that is one if firm i was covered by analyst j in year t but not in year t+1, and zero if firm i was covered by analyst j in both year t and t+1. DSimilarity An indicator variable that is one if there is at least one firm (other than firm i) appearing both in analyst j's portfolio and firm i's HP index calculation, and zero otherwise. PSimilarity N ijt /M jt , where M jt is the total number of firms in analyst j's portfolio while N ijt is the number of firms (other than firm i) shown both in analyst j's portfolio and firm i's HP index calculation.
Relative Accuracy
Hong and Kubik [2000] measure of relative accuracy. We rank analysts covering a stock in a year based on the absolute value of the difference between his/her latest forecast prior to earnings announcements and the actual earnings. Relative Accuracy = to 1 -(the analyst's rank -1) / (# of analysts covering the firm -1).
Relative Boldness
Hong and Kubik [2000] measure of boldness in earnings forecasts. A variable similarly defined as Relative Accuracy but based on the absolute value of the distance between the forecast and the consensus forecast (defined as the average of the other analysts' forecasts).
Relative Breadth
A variable similarly defined as Relative Accuracy but based on the number of firms covered by the analyst in a given year.
Relative Firm Experience
A variable similarly defined as Relative Accuracy but based on the number of years that an analyst has covered the specific firm.
Broker Size
Number of analysts employed by a brokerage house.
Relative Horizon
A variable similarly defined as Relative Accuracy based on the number of days between the last forecast and earnings announcement dates. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for variables in the firm level regressions. Similarity is the HP index, i.e., total similarity measure (TNIC3TSIMM) from Hoberg and Phillips [2010b] . RSimilarity is the decile ranks of 0-9 based on the HP index each year divided by 9. Coverage is the number of analysts providing annual earnings forecasts for the firm. Accuracy is the negative of the absolute value of the difference between I/B/E/S actual earnings and the latest consensus forecast prior to earnings announcements, scaled by share price at the prior fiscal year end. Dispersion is the standard deviation of individual analyst forecasts in the latest consensus forecasts prior to earnings announcements, scaled by share price at the fiscal year end. Market Cap represents market value of equity. Book-to-Market is the ratio of book value of equity over market value of equity. Inst. Holdings is the percentage of institutional ownership at the prior fiscal year end. Return Volatility represents the standard deviation of a firm's monthly stock returns in the prior fiscal year. #Segments is the number of reported business segments in the Compustat segment file at the prior fiscal year end. # Mgt. Forecasts is the number of management earnings forecasts issued in the fiscal year. R&D Intensity equals to research and development expense as a percentage of operating expense at the prior fiscal year end. Advertising Intensity is the advertising expense as a percentage of operating expense at the prior fiscal year end. Share Volume is the share volume in millions of shares in the fiscal year. Loss Firms is an indicator that is one if earnings per share are negative, and zero otherwise. |ΔEPS| is the absolute value of the difference between the prior two years' earnings per share deflated by share price at the prior fiscal year end.
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for variables in the firm-analyst level regressions. Drop is an indicator variable that is one if firm i was covered by analyst j in year t but not in year t+1, and zero if firm i was covered by analyst j in both years t and t+1. Add is an indicator variable that is one if firm i was not covered by analyst j in year t-1 but is covered in year t, and zero if firm i was not covered by analyst j in either year t-1 or t. DSimilarity is an indicator variable that is one if there is at least one firm (other than firm i) appearing both in analyst j's portfolio and firm i's HP index calculation, and zero otherwise. PSimilarity equals to N ijt /M jt , where M jt is the total number of firms in analyst j's portfolio while N ijt is the number of firms (other than firm i) shown both in analyst j's portfolio and firm i's HP index calculation. Relative Accuracy is Hong and Kubik's [2000] measure of relative accuracy.
Panel C presents descriptive statistics for variables in the analyst level regressions. Fire is an indicator variable that is one if analyst j is demoted (moves to a different and smaller brokerage house) or permanently leaves the I/B/E/S database in the following year (i.e., between July 1 of year t+1 and June 30 of year t + 2), and zero otherwise. Star is an indicator variable that is one if the analyst is in Institutional Investor magazine's All American Team, and zero otherwise. DDensity is the mean of DSimilarity of firms in an analyst's portfolio. PDensity is the mean of PSimilarity of firms in an analyst's portfolio. Accuracy is the average of Relative Accuracy at the firm-analyst level over all firms in an analyst's portfolio. Breadth is the number of firms covered by the analyst in a given year. Boldness is the average of Relative Boldness at the firm-analyst level over all firms in an analyst's portfolio. General Experience is the number of years that an analyst has issued forecasts in I/B/E/S. Broker Size is the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house. 
Coverage is the number of analysts providing annual earnings forecasts for the firm. RSimilarity is the decile ranks of 0-9 based on the HP index each year divided by 9. Ln (Market Cap) represents the natural logarithm of market value of equity. Book-to-Market is the ratio of book value of equity over market value of equity. Inst. Holdings is the percentage of institutional ownership at the prior fiscal year end. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of a firm's monthly stock returns in the prior fiscal year. Ln (#Segments) is the natural logarithm of the number of reported business segments in the Compustat segment file at the prior fiscal year end. # Mgt. Forecasts is the number of management earnings forecasts issued in the fiscal year. R&D Intensity is the research and development expense over operating expense at the prior fiscal year end. Advertising Intensity is the advertising expense over operating expense at the prior fiscal year end. Share Volume is the share volume in millions of shares in the fiscal year. Loss Firms equals one if earnings per share are negative, and zero otherwise. In Equation (2), we take the first difference of every variable in Equation (1) except for the standard deviation of return. We include the square terms of RSimilarity it 2 and
ΔRSimilarity it 2 in columns 2 and 4, respectively, to examine potential nonlinear relation. We include year fixed effects and industry (Fama and French 48-industry) fixed effects in all regressions. z-statistics reported in parentheses are robust to firm and year clustering. * * * , * * , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Accuracy is the negative of the absolute value of the difference between I/B/E/S actual earnings and the latest consensus forecast prior to earnings announcements, scaled by share price at the prior fiscal year end. Dispersion is the standard deviation of individual analyst forecasts in the latest consensus forecasts prior to earnings announcements, scaled by share price at the fiscal year end. RSimilarity is the decile ranks of 0-9 based on the HP index each year divided by 9. Ln (Market Cap) represents the natural logarithm of market value of equity. Book-to-Market is the ratio of book value of equity over market value of equity. Inst. Holdings is the percentage of institutional ownership at the prior fiscal year end. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of a firm's monthly stock returns in the prior fiscal year. Ln (#Segments) is the natural logarithm of the number of reported business segments in the Compustat segment file at the prior fiscal year end. # Mgt. Forecasts is the number of management earnings forecasts issued in the fiscal year. R&D Intensity is the research and development expense over operating expense at the prior fiscal year end. Advertising Intensity is the advertising expense over operating expense at the prior fiscal year end. Share Volume is the share volume in millions of shares in the fiscal year. Loss Firms equals one if earnings per share are negative, and zero otherwise. |ΔEPS| is the absolute value of the difference between the prior two years' earnings per share deflated by share price at the prior fiscal year end. In Equation (4), we take the first difference of every variable in Equation (3) except for the standard deviation of return. We include year fixed effects and industry (Fama and French 48-industry) fixed effects in all regressions. z-statistics reported in parentheses are robust to firm and year clustering. * * * , * * , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
We report the drop decision results in columns 1-2 and the add decision results in columns 3. Drop equals one if firm i was covered by analyst j in year t but not in year t+1, and zero if firm i was covered by analyst j in both years t and t+1. Add equals one if firm i was not covered by analyst j in year t-1 but is covered in year t, and zero if firm i was not covered by analyst j in either year t-1 or t. DSimilarity equals one if there is at least one firm (other than firm i) appearing both in analyst j's portfolio and firm i's HP index calculation, and zero otherwise. PSimilarity equals to N ijt /M jt , where M jt is the total number of firms in analyst j's portfolio while N ijt is the number of firms (other than firm i) shown both in analyst j's portfolio and firm i's HP index calculation. Ln (Market Cap) represents the natural logarithm of market value of equity. Book-to-Market is the ratio of book value of equity over market value of equity. Inst. Holdings is the percentage of institutional ownership at the prior fiscal year end. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of a firm's monthly stock returns in the prior fiscal year. Ln (#Segments) is the natural logarithm of the number of reported business segments in the Compustat segment file at the prior fiscal year end. # Mgt. Forecasts is the number of management earnings forecasts issued in the fiscal year. R&D Intensity is the research and development expense over operating expense at the prior fiscal year end. Advertising Intensity is the advertising expense over operating expense at the prior fiscal year end. Share Volume is the share volume in millions of shares in the fiscal year. Loss Firms equals one if earnings per share are negative, and zero otherwise. z-statistics reported in parentheses are robust to analyst, firm, and year clustering. * * * , * * , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. We include year fixed effects in all regressions. z-statistics reported in parentheses are robust to analyst, firm, and year clustering. * * * , * * , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Fire is an indicator variable that is one if analyst j is demoted (moves to a different and smaller brokerage house) or permanently leaves the I/B/E/S database in the following year (i.e., between July 1 of year t+1 and June 30 of year t + 2), and zero otherwise. DDensity is the mean of DSimilarity of firms in an analyst's portfolio. PDensity is the mean of PSimilarity of firms in an analyst's portfolio. Star is an indicator variable that is one if the analyst is in Institutional Investor magazine's All American Team, and zero otherwise. Accuracy is the average of Relative Accuracy at the firm-analyst level over all firms in an analyst's portfolio. Breadth is the average of Relative Breadth at the firm-analyst level over all firms in an analyst's portfolio. Boldness is the average of Relative Boldness at the firm-analyst level over all firms in an analyst's portfolio. General Experience is the number of years that an analyst has issued forecasts in I/B/E/S. Broker Size is the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house. z-statistics reported in parentheses are robust to analyst and year clustering. * * * , * * , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Star is an indicator variable that is one if the analyst is in Institutional Investor magazine's All American Team, and zero otherwise. DDensity is the mean of DSimilarity of firms in an analyst's portfolio. PDensity is the mean of PSimilarity of firms in an analyst's portfolio. Accuracy is the average of Relative Accuracy at the firm-analyst level over all firms in an analyst's portfolio. Breadth is the average of Relative Breadth at the firm-analyst level over all firms in an analyst's portfolio. Boldness is the average of Relative Boldness at the firm-analyst level over all firms in an analyst's portfolio. General Experience is the number of years that an analyst has issued forecasts in I/B/E/S. Broker Size is the number of analysts employed by a brokerage house. z-statistics reported in parentheses are robust to analyst and year clustering. * * * , * * , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
